Is software dead?
5 min read
By Ben Preston About the author >>

Key takeaways
01 AI is reshaping software economics
Software is becoming faster and cheaper to produce, creating genuine pressure for businesses whose products are easy to replicate.
02 Not every sell-off creates value
Lower share prices may signal opportunity or lasting damage. Investors must distinguish excessive pessimism from impaired intrinsic value.
03 What AI cannot replicate matters
Proprietary data, embedded workflows, trusted relationships and adaptable management may make some companies far harder to disrupt.
Investors treated recurring subscription revenues almost like annuities...
The critical question for an investor is whether true intrinsic value is impaired, or whether the market is just being overly pessimistic.
...there is a strong possibility that some perfectly healthy babies are being thrown out with the bathwater.
For years, one of the more popular investment mantras was Marc Andreessen's “software is eating the world”. The basic software business model was simple but highly effective. Software could perform routine tasks with higher accuracy, greater speed and at much lower cost than human employees. Rather than every company having to develop its own software, specialist companies could write code once and then sell it repeatedly to companies for less than the cost of employing a single developer.
What wasn't to love? From Microsoft to Oracle, Salesforce, Autodesk and beyond, software companies grew rapidly to become some of the largest and most profitable companies in the world. Investors treated recurring subscription revenues almost like annuities and, while growth continued, were happy to look past near-term profits (or, often, the lack thereof) to the high margins of the future that could be achieved with scale. That combination fuelled years of investor enthusiasm, leaving many software companies carrying lofty expectations and, in the era of rock-bottom interest rates, generous valuations.
But more recently, Andreessen's mantra has been flipped on its head. Higher interest rates were the first, slow-burn challenge: embedding higher discount rates, investors became less willing to pay up today for profits expected far in the future. Then, far more dramatically, the fear that “AI is eating software” drove the “SaaSpocalypse”, leaving investors questioning whether those high future profits would appear at all.
AI disruption fears saw sell-offs in multiple sectors Single-day sell-offs on AI news*
28 Feb 2026 | Source: Jefferies, S&P Capital IQ, Orbis. *Average percentage change in share price for a representative bucket of stocks, measured from the prior trading day’s close to the close on the date shown. Front Office Apps Software: Braze, DocuSign, HubSpot, Klaviyo. Gaming: AppLovin, Roblox, Take-Two, Unity Software. Legal Tech: LegalZoom, Thomson Reuters, Wolters Kluwer. Insurance Brokers: Aon, Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., Willis Towers Watson, Marsh & McLennan Companies. Wealth Managers: LPL Financial Holdings, Raymond James Financial, The Charles Schwab Corporation. Property Managers & Office REITs: BXP, CBRE Group, Jones Lang LaSalle, SL Green Realty. Freight Logistics: C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Landstar System, J.B. Hunt Transport Services, RXO. ^Real Estate Investment Trusts.
A new threat to the software model
A new generation of large language models appeared capable of producing software faster and more cheaply than human developers. The implication was simple: why pay for software subscriptions when you will soon be able to just ask ChatGPT or Claude to spin up code for whatever your business needs? In February 2026, Citrini Research’s gloomy, futuristic “June 2028” thought exercise went viral, crystallising the market’s pessimism and helping fuel a sell-off in software shares. Incumbent software businesses in everything from legal research to cybersecurity looked fragile, and those still on the path to profitability risked never getting there. Investors, en masse, decided they did not want to wait to find out.
Software: a market darling under scrutiny Total return (USD) of US Software since 1 Sep 2016, indexed to 100
30 Sep 2026 | Source: LSEG Datastream, Orbis. Daily total return index. US Software represented by the iShares Expanded Tech-Software Sector ETF.
Amid the rapid decline in software share prices, valuations became far more reasonable and—in some cases—appeared quite attractive. Of course, a lower price does not automatically mean better value: falling share prices can sometimes be the first sign that the underlying economics have changed for the worse. The critical question for an investor is whether true intrinsic value is impaired, or whether the market is just being overly pessimistic.
What’s the answer? “It depends!” The key to understanding software companies is that they are not all alike. Some companies—for example, those that simply rely on a software layer that may be replicable—will likely prove far easier to disrupt than those who have some unique value which won’t be so easy to build from scratch. We believe the most appropriate approach is not to pontificate on the overall threat from a top-down perspective, but rather to appraise each company on its own merits—which is exactly what our team of bottom-up business analysts is designed to do.
Not all software is created equal
Constellation Software, for example, owns highly specialised software businesses that are embedded in customers’ daily operations. These include Trapeze Group, whose scheduling, dispatch and on-board systems help public transport agencies run their networks. In our view, Constellation’s long-standing customer relationships and deep knowledge of specific industries typically make switching to a new supplier hard to justify.
Experian, a credit bureau, has spent over half a century building its database of payment histories, and it rests on the foundation of 200 years of trust-based relationships with lenders. It can provide financial institutions with unique data on the credit profiles of over a billion consumers worldwide. We believe that will be extraordinarily difficult for AI to recreate.
Robert Half, the staffing agency, tells us that candidates are now making far more job applications with AI than they were previously able to do manually. Recruiters are overwhelmed by applications, which are often more embellished when produced with AI than when prepared by candidates themselves. Even as some question whether there will be jobs left to recruit for, we believe the growing volume of applications actually enhances the value of Robert Half’s filtering service.
Look beyond the labels
Let’s take a step back. Yes, it’s true that software is now easier, faster and cheaper to produce. That’s a significant change that will challenge the economics of many software businesses. Mr Market seems to be of the view that all of them are at risk. But change is always messy, and the devil is often in the details. Great management teams will be able to adapt, perhaps even finding ways to use their unique advantages to use AI to accelerate their growth, not to be victimised by it. Amazon, for example, began life by selling books, CDs and DVDs—all of which have been disrupted by new technology—but ultimately found ways to harness the new technology which might easily have been predicted to kill it.
Simply using an index classification (“Software”) to determine the winners and losers of the future does not capture the full range of companies with different products, customers and competitive advantages. With markets increasingly enamoured by the attention-grabbing growth of AI, there is a strong possibility that some perfectly healthy babies are being thrown out with the bathwater.
Keep exploring our six questions for 2027
FTSE: London Stock Exchange Group plc and its group undertakings (collectively, the “LSE Group”). © LSE Group 2026. FTSE Russell is a trading name of certain of the LSE Group companies. “FTSE®” “Russell®”, “FTSE Russell®”, “FTSE4Good®”, “ICB®”, are trade marks of the relevant LSE Group companies and is/are used by any other LSE Group company under license. All rights in the FTSE Russell indexes or data vest in the relevant LSE Group company which owns the index or the data. Neither LSE Group nor its licensors accept any liability for any errors or omissions in the indexes or data and no party may rely on any indexes or data contained in this communication. No further distribution of data from the LSE Group is permitted without the relevant LSE Group company’s express written consent. The LSE Group does not promote, sponsor or endorse the content of this communication.
S&P Capital IQ: Copyright © 2026 S&P Global Market Intelligence. All rights reserved. S&P Global Market Intelligence, its affiliates and third-party providers (collectively, “S&P Global”) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, availability or timeliness of the content and are not responsible for any errors or omissions or for results obtained from its use. The content is provided on an “as is” basis and does not constitute investment advice or a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any security or make any investment decision. No copying, reproduction or further distribution of the S&P Global content is permitted without prior written consent. Nothing in this communication should be taken as implying sponsorship or endorsement by S&P Global.
Jefferies: © 2026 Jefferies LLC. All rights reserved. Information supplied by Jefferies LLC has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but Jefferies LLC does not guarantee its accuracy, completeness or timeliness and accepts no responsibility for errors or omissions or for results obtained from its use. The information is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice, an offer or solicitation, or a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any security or other financial instrument. Any opinions or estimates are given as at their stated date and may change without notice. Material excerpted or summarised from Jefferies research remains subject to the disclaimers and disclosures contained in the relevant research report. No Jefferies content may be reproduced or redistributed without prior written consent.
Important information
For financial advisers and wholesale client investors only. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. This constitutes general information only and not personal financial product, tax, legal, or investment advice, and does not take into account the specific investment objectives, financial situation or individual needs of any particular person. This should not under any circumstances be construed as an opinion or recommendation to invest in any financial product or to adopt any investment strategy.
This report represents Orbis' view at a point in time and provides reasoning or rationale on why we bought or sold a particular security for the Orbis Funds. We may take the opposite view/position from that stated in this report. This is because our view may change as facts or circumstances change. This report does not prohibit the Orbis Funds from dealing in the securities before or after this document is published. The value of investments in the Orbis Funds may fall as well as rise and you may get back less than you originally invested. It is therefore important that you understand the risks involved before investing.
Equity Trustees Limited AFSL No. 240975 ABN 46 004 031 298 (EQT) is the responsible entity for and issuer of units in the Orbis Funds domiciled in Australia. You should consider such funds’ Product Disclosure Statement (PDS) or Information Memorandum (IM) and Target Market Determinations (TMDs), as applicable, before acquiring or disposing units in such funds. The PDS, IM and TMD can be obtained from www.orbis.com.au. Each TMD sets out who an investment in the relevant Fund might be appropriate for and the circumstances that trigger a review of the TMD.



