Would you hire the index?
5 min read
By Eric Marais About the author >>

Key takeaways
01 The index expresses a view
Market-cap weighting means the index reflects where investor enthusiasm and capital are concentrated.
02 Narrow markets reward similarity
As leadership has narrowed, portfolios that looked more like the index have been more likely to keep up.
03 Diversification needs difference
When market leadership changes, index-like portfolios may offer less diversification than investors expect.
Choosing to track the index is still an investment decision, which deserves the same scrutiny.
All investors have a hot streak now and then. When one comes, clients and allocators rightly start asking tougher questions. Where are your big risk concentrations? How much room is left for the winners to run?
One portfolio that seems to escape this kind of pushback is the index itself, along with the many portfolios that track it closely. The usual explanation is that the index isn’t a manager, but the benchmark which active managers are measured against. It holds everything and expresses no view. By that logic the index is passive, a faceless entity that cannot be hauled in front of a disappointed investment committee.
We disagree. Choosing to track the index is still an investment decision, which deserves the same scrutiny.
Passive construction, active identity
A capitalisation-weighted index holds each constituent in proportion to its market value, which often reflects the mood of the investing collective more than a rational account of future cash flows. And as Benjamin Graham observed, at least in the short term, the market is a voting machine, not a weighing machine.
In that sense, the index has often expressed a clear identity. In 1989 the FTSE World Index (World Index) held over 40% in Japan as investors scrambled for exposure to a rising economic superpower. Ten years later, technology, media and telecommunications (TMT) stocks dominated. In 2021 the loose-money era (ultra-low rates and quantitative easing that followed the global financial crisis) peaked and even the most fantastical business models received funding. In each case, the market’s vote was lopsided, and the index reflected that.
Today, the vote is for AI, cast by everyone from Korean mom-and-pop speculators to the world’s most sophisticated pension funds. The technology sector makes up 37% of the World Index, which understates exposure given the growing list of industrial and other businesses with revenues linked to the AI capital expenditure cycle.
Recent results show a market that rewarded concentrated exposure to its largest winners, rather than evidence of poor stockpicking.
How did we get here?
Strong returns from a narrow group of AI-geared companies drove the concentration. In recent quarters, as few as 30% of stocks in the World Index outperformed the index itself, continuing a pattern of volatile but declining win ratios that echo the TMT era.
The World Index has been exceptionally narrow Winner ratio in the FTSE World Index, 1988 to September 2026
30 Sep 2026 | Source: FTSE, Orbis. The winner ratio is the proportion of shares in the FTSE World Index that outperformed the index over the period. Narrow, Broad and Normal are illustrative of the prevailing environment. TMT = Technology, Media and Telecommunications.
For active managers, this has been a headwind. Since 2023, following ChatGPT’s launch, the World Index has beaten 70% of active global equity funds on the eVestment database on average. That is the best streak on record and well above the 50% yearly average since 2001. Many see this data and conclude “active managers underperform”, but is that really what’s happening? Have active stockpickers suddenly and collectively become unskilled?
To test this, we asked how 'dartboard portfolios' with no skill at all fared. We built 10,000 random 50-stock, equally weighted portfolios, each drawn from varying basket sizes of the largest stocks in the World Index. On average, you might think about half of these portfolios would beat the index. But since ChatGPT’s launch (portfolios held from January 2023 to September 2026) the index has beaten 71% of them, consistent with real-world results.
The recent results show a market that rewarded concentrated exposure to its largest winners, rather than evidence of poor stockpicking.
A rational response to a narrow market
When a theme like AI takes off and active managers follow, they are often accused of FOMO, but a more generous reading is that it is rational. In a narrow market, the biggest risk is missing the big winners, and owning them lowers that risk.
The chart below splits out two groups from our earlier set of dartboard portfolios by active share, the share of a portfolio that differs from its benchmark. The index beat 79% of the truly active group (active share over 95%), more than in the overall sample. In contrast, it beat only 51% of the less active group (active share under 80%).
The more different portfolios looked, the more likely they were to lag. Index-hugging portfolios kept up by missing fewer of the big winners. In effect, it paid to own the largest companies.
Staying closer to the index has paid off Distribution of annualised total returns by active share group since 2023
30 Sep 2026 | Source: FTSE, Orbis. Statistics are compiled from an internal research database and are subject to subsequent revision due to changes in methodology or data cleaning. High-active-share portfolios are defined as portfolios with active share above 95%; low-active-share portfolios have active share below 80%. Based on a Monte Carlo simulation of the annualised total returns for 10,000 randomly selected 50-stock (equally weighted) portfolios taken from varying baskets of the largest stocks in the FTSE World Index at 31 Dec 2022 and held until 30 Sep 2026. Returns are annualised total returns in USD. *Annualised total return of the FTSE World Index.
The less active group points to the managers who have attracted the most capital in recent years: many holdings, low tracking error, and the largest companies held at close to their index weights. That approach works if markets stay narrow, but if leadership changes, the index’s identity becomes a risk in itself.
Clients and allocators who own the index, and portfolios built to resemble it, may not be getting the diversification they expect.
What happens when leadership changes?
The obvious risk to the index is that AI turns out to be a bubble, but we are not making that case. The risk we see is quieter, that leadership can change without AI disappointing. Sometimes the neglected simply become too cheap to ignore.
A sharper reversal is even harder on the index. Our dartboard portfolios show what happened: the index beat just 31% of them in 2000 as the TMT bubble burst, and 16% in 2022 as the loose-money era ended, against 71% since ChatGPT’s launch. Portfolios built to resemble the index share that risk.
Conclusion
Clients and allocators who own the index, and portfolios built to resemble it, may not be getting the diversification they expect. Genuine diversification comes from portfolios that behave differently. Investors should ask what a new manager would add to what they already own—regardless of style. Put that question to the index and its lookalikes, and the answer may be very little.
Would you still hire the index? And if so, would you still give it the same weight?
Keep exploring our six questions for 2027
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